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Toward the end of December 1997 President Boris N. Yel'tsin signed Decree No. 1300 
which gave the attached document, (2) titled "National Security Concept of the Russian 
Federation," the force of law and thus bypassed parliament. He also assigned control 
over implementation of the concept to the Security Council. An article by Ivan P. Rybkin, 
secretary of that presidential advisory body, had listed its duties as follows:
• identification of internal and external threats to security
• development of guidelines for a national security strategy
• preparation of federal programs to support the latter (3)
The second of these responsibilities reportedly culminated in a draft national security 
concept, submitted for discussion at the Security Council session on 7 May 1997 and 
reportedly endorsed at that time. Rybkin was interviewed less than a week later about 
this draft document. In the military sphere, defense of Russia's national interests and 
territorial integrity by force of arms is still relevant, he said, because there remains a risk 
of armed conflict "on our own borders as well as those around the Commonwealth of 
Independent States" (CIS). (4) From this statement, it is apparent that Moscow intends 
to protect external geographic boundaries of the former Soviet Union.
Contents of the Draft Document
An investigative reporter may have obtained a copy of the draft concept, because she 
used quotation marks for what would appear to be verbatim excerpts. From the section 
titled Russian Federation Security in the Defense Sphere, the journalist quoted as 
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follows: "Russia is not attempting to maintain quantitative parity with leading world 
states in arms and armed forces." (5) On the other hand, Russia "must possess nuclear 
forces capable of deterrence, causing unacceptable damage to any aggressor (with 
secondary and tertiary consequences)." What is in parenthesis, according to Ms. 
Kalinina, refers to radiation fallout that would affect civilians.
The foregoing was amplified by Boris A. Berezovsky, at the time deputy secretary of the 
Security Council, who stated over Moscow Radio that "we are not talking about making 
a nuclear first strike to secure a strategic advantage. However, if we are driven into a 
corner and are left with no other way out, we will use nuclear weapons." (6) This 
repeated almost verbatim what Rybkin had stated earlier. The final document itself, as 
mentioned later, refers to preemptive decisions in defense of national interests.
Ms. Kalinina also reported that the new national security concept would be based on 
geopolitical considerations that require a Russian military presence in a number of 
countries throughout the so-called "near abroad." The latter term is used to identify 
former republics of the USSR, now supposedly independent states. Russian military 
bases in these countries are required in order "to react in a crisis situation during the 
initial stage of a conflict."
Another source, who serves as director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies in 
Moscow, published a paper in which the draft national security concept is discussed. 
Sergei M. Rogov stated that this 30-page document had not been released and based 
his reportage on unnamed experts who worked on the preamble as well as the four 
chapters. He could have been one of those experts. According to Rogov, threats to 
Russia's national security include
• economic crises at home
• proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction
• undermining world stability and
• international terrorism
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Ensuring national security in the sphere of international relations is based on strategic 
partners and allies, as well as on a future sub-system of Euro-Atlantic security. (7) 
Neither strategic partners nor the new sub-system were identified by Rogov.
The previous Defense Council secretary (until 28 August 1997), Yuri M. Baturin, 
explained the draft national security concept as being based upon five centers of power: 
the United States, Russia, Germany, China, and Japan. When asked by a reporter 
whether Islamic countries were considered to be a threat, Baturin responded in the 
affirmative. Why? Because the West Europeans and Americans were attempting to 
redirect Islamic aggression toward Russia, away from the United States and Israel. For 
this reason, the war in Chechnya had been provoked by these enemies of Moscow. 
Turkey, on behalf of NATO, allegedly plays the role of regional superpower within the 
vast area between Tajikistan and Bosnia. (8)
The successor to Baturin, Andrei A. Kokoshin, formerly had been the civilian first deputy 
defense minister. He explained the new Euro-Atlantic security sub-system, envisaged 
by Moscow, as follows: A treaty on security within this region should be signed by all or 
most European countries, the United States, and Canada. Such a sub-system "could 
emerge under the aegis of OSCE" (9) (Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe). At the 1994 meeting in Budapest of what was then called the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Russia failed to obtain support for such a 
metamorphosis which would have subordinated NATO to the CSCE. At that time, 
Moscow had attempted to equate the so-called Commonwealth of Independent States 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The New Document
The 12,000-word concept begins with a preamble which emphasizes its importance as 
the foundation of state policy. This is followed by four sections that discuss (1) world 
trends and Russia's participation therein; (2) national interests, domestic and foreign, 
including defense; (3) principal threats to national security; and (4) fundamentals of a 
national security strategy.
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Thus, national interests require a proactive foreign policy which will result in Russia 
again becoming a great power. Prerequisites for such enhanced status include
• integration with the CIS
• equal partnership with other great powers
• international cooperation against trans-national crime and terrorism
• strengthening collective management of world processes, where Russia plays an 
important role (especially in the UN)
• protection of borders, territorial integrity, and the constitutional system
Threats to national security result from political, economic, and ethnic crises that would 
adversely affect the CIS integration process. This could become aggravated by local 
wars and armed conflict close to state borders. Establishment of large concentrations of 
hostile armed forces adjacent to Russian territory remains a potential threat-an obvious 
reference to NATO expansion.
Safeguarding national security "as an influential Eurasian power," Russia claims not to 
pursue hegemonistic or expansionist objectives. It supports a new system of European-
Atlantic security in which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe would 
become coordinator. Moscow prefers the same kind of system in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Local conflicts should be settled individually by the CIS, the UN, and OSCE.
Russia does not seek parity in defense with leading states of the world. It will adhere to 
a posture of "realistic deterrence." Therefore, it must retain sufficient nuclear forces to 
inflict destruction on any individual aggressor and even a coalition which uses either 
conventional or nuclear weapons that threaten the existence of Russia as a state. Thus, 
nuclear missiles could be used in response to a non-nuclear attack or even the threat of 
one, i.e., in a first strike mode, which is the meaning of the following statement in the 
concept:
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In guaranteeing the national security of the Russian Federation, special importance is 
attached to establishment of systems to prepare and adopt preemptive decisions in 
defense of the country's national interests. [emphasis added]
To ensure its security, a Russian military presence may be required "in certain strategic 
regions of the world." Stationing troops there, based on treaties, would fulfill alliance 
commitments and allow for a timely reaction to crises. This reminds one of Soviet 
combat operations between 1950 and 1989 from such bases in North Korea, Algeria, 
Egypt, South Yemen, Vietnam, Syria, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan 
(see table).
Restructuring of defense industry, based on new technologies and scientific potential; 
support for and development of research, experimental and design work; as well as 
modernization of arms and military equipment must be pursued vigorously.
The national security concept ends with a listing of participants in its implementation: 
the president, parliament, government, and Security Council. This last organization 
formulates proposals for decisions in the event of a direct threat to the country. Finally, 
the concept will be "augmented and clarified in the annual messages from the president 
to parliament."
The underlying theme in this document conveys the admission that Russia can no 
longer claim major power status. However, it intends to regain such recognition by 
consolidating and extending its control over the former USSR, i.e., minus the Baltic 
states. This objective is being pursued by various means, including establishment of 
military bases on the territory of other CIS member states under the guise of protecting 
their external borders. If necessary, economic and other pressure is applied to gain 
such access, a recent example being Georgia. (10)
A robust research and development effort may soon eclipse the defense ministry 
budget, suggested by trends in allocation of funds since 1994. High technology R & D 
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has already produced several advanced weapons systems, with others under 
development for the 21st century.
For example:
• deployment of mobile and silo-based Topol M-2 or SS-27 began at the end of 
December 1997 at Tatishchevo in Saratov province and will replace 90 SS-18 
ICBMs.
• a new tactical system of nuclear weapons, with a range of 400 kilometers, 
successfully completed testing at the end of 1995.
• super-small nuclear warheads, weighing less than 90 kilograms, are already in 
production.
• construction has begun on the first of seven most advanced Boreia-class nuclear-
powered submarines, equipped with the new D-31 SLBMs.
• R & D centers and design bureaus are perfecting laser as well as radio-frequency 
particle beam weapons. (11)
The above listing of these new projects is based on information from Major General 
Vladimir Ivanovich Slipchenko, who had been director of scientific research for the 
General Staff until recently, as well as from a senior official at the Rosvooruzheniye 
agency for the sale abroad of Russian weapons who preferred anonymity.
It would seem obvious from the foregoing that, in their drive to regain world power 
status, Russia's decision makers believe that the quickest way of doing so will be to 
restore their influence throughout the former Soviet republics and equip their own armed 
forces with 21st century weapons. What will their counterparts in the US government do 
in view of these objectives?
 
6
SOVIET COMBAT OPERATIONS ABROAD, 1950-1989
 Country!  ! ! ! ! Period of Time
North Korea! ! ! ! ! June 1950 - July 1953
Algeria!  ! ! ! ! 1962-1964
United Arab Republic ! ! ! 18 October 1962 - 1 April 1963
(Egypt)! ! ! ! ! 1 October 1969 - 16 July 1972
! ! ! ! ! ! 5 October 1973 - 1 April 1974
People's Democratic Republic! ! 18 October 1962 - 1 April 1963
of (South) Yemen!
Vietnam! !  ! ! ! 1 July 1965 - 31 December 1974
Syria!  ! ! ! ! ! 5-13 June 1967; 6-24 October 1972
Angola!  ! ! ! ! November 1975 - November 1979
Mozambique! ! ! ! ! November 1975 - November 1979
Ethiopia!  ! ! ! ! 9 December 1977 - 30 November 1979
Afghanistan!  ! ! ! ! 22 April 1978 - 30 November 1979
! ! ! ! ! ! 25 December 1979 - 15 February 1989
Sources: Lt. Gen. A.D. Sidorov (chief of cadres in the USSR Ministry of Defense), "Dlia 
tekh, kto voeval," Krasnaya zvezda, 12 October 1989, p. 2; Col. V. Izgarshev, "Ne 
utikhaet bol' afganskaya," Pravda, 15 November 1989, p. 4.
Note: It is interesting that neither of the above sources lists Cuba, where combat troops 
had been dispatched in 1962 to install Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles 
targeted at the United States.
Future Prospects
Perhaps one should not worry about a first strike by means of intercontinental or 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. After all, the 1994 agreement with Russia 
specifically obligated that country's military leaders to detarget the United States. During 
the latest summit at Helsinki in March 1997, the same pledge was repeated, even 
though Yel'tsin reportedly thought he was offering something new. In a different context, 
US Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen stated at a press conference on 24 April 
1997 that certain intelligence is difficult to gather in Russia, because Moscow does not 
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permit inspection of its ICBMs or SLBMs by Americans. How then can the US really 
know whether these strategic weapons systems are being destroyed under terms of the 
START I treaty or even that detargeting has taken place? (12)
That still leaves, of course, the estimated 18,000 to 20,000 tactical nuclear warheads 
which are either deployed or remain in supposedly safe storage.(13) These will be used 
only if Yel'tsin decides to eliminate a perceived threat along Russian or CIS borders. 
Even if we believe he would never give such an order, what about his successors or an 
army commander acting on his own? Should US policy makers, in the light of these 
developments, continue to place their confidence in a man who has had serious health 
problems and twice reportedly attempted suicide?(14) Or should they emulate the 
Russians who base their approach toward the West on an assessment of capabilities 
and not on intentions?
On 7 October 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright testified before the US 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the strategic rationale for NATO expansion. 
She said that "questions about the future of Russia" remain and that "one should not 
dismiss the possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of the past." Secretary 
Albright subsequently warned in mid-December about the "threat from Eurasia," which 
could only mean Russia. (15)
The earlier testimony took place before the news that sixteen advanced computers had 
been purchased by Russia late last year through the IBM office in Germany, without US 
government permission, apart from those delivered earlier also by IBM and Silicon 
Graphics. They were all shipped to the Arzamas-16 federal nuclear science center 
which designs and assembles warheads.(16) The other such installation, 
Chelyabinsk-70, previously had received similar American computers. Moscow refuses 
to return the equipment, nor will it allow any inspection by US government officials.
Such behavior indicates that the United States is no longer considered to be a "strategic 
partner" of Russia. (17) That designation has been bestowed upon such countries as 
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China and India, both of which receive the latest weapons systems as well as technical 
advisors from Russia's military-industrial complex to develop their own advanced 
weapons technology.
Before any of the above will result in strategic relations, however, the Kremlin must 
reestablish its hegemony throughout most of what had been part of the USSR. The first 
order of business involves the so-called Commonwealth of Independent States which 
held its latest summit at Chisinau, Moldova on 23 October 1997. The presidents of 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the host country strongly criticized the Russian approach to 
"peace-making" in their countries. Little could be accomplished at this session.
On the other hand, the prospect for a single CIS currency was discussed for 
implementation between the years 2005 and 2010. (18) A customs union has been able 
to attract only Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan in Russia's attempt to strengthen 
integration. All of those countries also cooperate in mutual defense of external CIS 
borders. Only Azerbaijan and Ukraine oppose such arrangements.
It is the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and those in the Transcaucasus that 
represent a buffer between Russia and the Muslim countries of Afghanistan, Iran, and 
Turkey. If Russia cannot maintain its influence throughout this region, conditions may 
result in penetration of Muslim areas inside Russia itself, beginning with the northern 
Caucasus. That would certainly contribute to dissolution of the so-called Commonwealth 
of Independent States, regardless of a national security concept which may never be 
implemented. 
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